Key Highlights
Canada’s post-quantum cryptography (PQC) roadmap for Government of Canada non-classified IT systems sets migration milestones through 2035. Initial departmental migration plans were targeted for April 2026, high-priority systems for the end of 2031, and remaining systems for the end of 2035.
The roadmap is organized around three phases: preparation, identification, and transition. Beyond the headline dates, several details stand out in how Canada approaches cryptographic inventory, migration prioritization, procurement, and systems that may be difficult to migrate.
Read the full Government of Canada PQC migration roadmap
Canada’s PQC Migration Timeline
The roadmap sets four key milestones:
| Timeline | Milestone |
|---|---|
| April 2026 | Develop an initial departmental PQC migration plan |
| Beginning April 2026 | Report migration progress annually |
| End of 2031 | Complete migration of high-priority systems |
| End of 2035 | Complete migration of remaining systems |
For the 2031 and 2035 completion milestones, supporting PQC alone is not sufficient. The roadmap states that quantum-vulnerable algorithms should be disabled, isolated, or tunnelled so that the associated quantum risk is mitigated.
Three Phases of the Roadmap
Canada organizes the migration into three recommended phases that may overlap:
| Phase | Focus |
|---|---|
| Preparation | Governance, financial planning, education, procurement, and planning for identification |
| Identification | Discover where and how cryptography is used, build inventory data, and determine migration priorities |
| Transition | Plan and carry out migration or other measures for quantum-vulnerable systems |
The preparation phase includes establishing responsibilities for the migration, financial planning, education, and procurement considerations. The identification phase focuses on locating quantum-vulnerable cryptography and developing the information needed to prioritize systems. The transition phase covers the implementation of migration plans, including systems that may require alternatives to a direct upgrade.
What Stands Out in Canada’s Roadmap
1. Canada Says to Start With an Incomplete Inventory
The roadmap recognizes that identifying quantum-vulnerable cryptography across a large IT environment can be a significant undertaking. Rather than waiting until every cryptographic asset has been identified, it recommends beginning with an initial, incomplete inventory and iteratively improving the data.
Canada also recommends using multiple discovery methodologies. These can include existing IT service management and security tools, network monitoring and inspection, endpoint detection and response tools, and independent tools capable of scanning networks, hosts, logs, and source code.
2. The Recommended Inventory Contains More Than Cryptographic Information
Canada provides considerable detail on what should be captured during the identification phase.
In addition to identifying system components that employ cryptography and their current cryptographic configurations, the roadmap recommends recording vendor and product versions, security controls that rely on cryptography, network zones, hosting platforms, and system dependencies.
The inventory can also include relevant service contracts and expiry dates, expected system refresh years, responsible points of contact, and migration priority.
Canada’s inventory therefore extends beyond identifying algorithms and cryptographic assets to include information about the systems in which they are used.
3. HNDL Is Specifically Included in Migration Prioritization
Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) is specifically addressed when Canada discusses migration priorities.
The roadmap recommends assigning high priority to systems susceptible to HNDL. This includes systems protecting information that travels across public networks and needs to remain confidential for a period long enough to face future quantum decryption risk.
Other factors identified for prioritization include the lifespan of the information being protected, the crypto-agility of the system, and the potential impact if the system is compromised.
4. PQC Is Already Part of Procurement Planning
Procurement is included in the preparation phase of Canada’s roadmap.
The guidance recommends that new procurements support PQC where appropriate. It also discusses including provisions for future PQC support in contracts involving cryptographic systems and considering cryptographic agility when acquiring new technology.
The roadmap notes that incorporating PQC requirements earlier in procurement can reduce future migration costs. It also recommends taking advantage of existing equipment refresh and system modernization cycles where possible.
5. The Roadmap Anticipates More Than One Transition Path
Canada does not assume that every quantum-vulnerable system can follow the same migration path.
The transition phase includes several possible approaches:
Upgrade | Replace | Tunnel | Isolate
Some systems may be upgraded to support PQC while maintaining backward compatibility during the transition. Quantum-vulnerable algorithms can then be disabled once compatibility with legacy systems is no longer required.
For legacy systems that cannot be upgraded, the roadmap notes that complete replacement may be necessary. Where replacement or migration cannot be completed within the required timeframe, isolation or tunnelling through PQC-protected infrastructure may also be considered.
Looking Ahead
Canada’s roadmap sets out a transition extending through 2035, but much of the work described in the roadmap begins considerably earlier.
Preparation covers governance, financial planning, education and procurement, while the identification phase focuses on discovering cryptography, building inventory data and determining migration priorities.
The transition phase then uses that information to determine whether affected systems can be upgraded or require other approaches such as replacement, tunnelling or isolation.
The roadmap applies specifically to Government of Canada non-classified IT systems. The full guidance is available from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.
About CeQureX
CeQureX (CQX) helps organizations prepare for and manage the transition to post-quantum cryptography. The CQX Wave Series includes:
- Wave-Key, a cryptographic inventory and assessment tool for discovering and understanding cryptographic assets.
- Wave-On, a PQC card for deploying post-quantum cryptography and supporting cryptographic modernization.
- Wave-Plus, a translation proxy designed to bridge PQC and existing environments during migration.
- WaaS (Wave as a Service), a service-based approach to ongoing PQC and cryptographic management.
Together, the CQX Wave Series supports the PQC journey from cryptographic visibility and assessment through migration and ongoing management.
Reference materials
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, Roadmap for the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography for the Government of Canada (ITSM.40.001), effective June 23, 2025.
Canadian Government PQC Migration Roadmap